This paper has two purposes. The first is to present a final coalgebra construction for finitary endofunctors on Set that uses a certain subset L * of the limit L of the first ω terms in the final sequence. L * is the set of points in L which arise from all coalgebras using their canonical morphisms into L, and it was used earlier for different purposes in Kurz and Pattinson [5] . Viglizzo in [11] showed that the same set L * carried a final coalgebra structure for functors in a certain inductively defined family. Our first goal is to generalize this to all finitary endofunctors; the result is implicit in Worrell [12] . The second goal is to use the final coalgebra construction to propose coalgebraic logics similar to those in [6] but for all finitary endofunctors F on Set. This time one can dispense with all conditions on F , construct a logical language LF directly from it, and prove that two points in a coalgebra satisfy the same sentences of LF iff they are identified by the final coalgebra morphism. The language LF is very spare, having no boolean connectives. This work on LF is thus a re-working of coalgebraic logic for finitary functors on sets.
Introduction
The introduction of coalgebraic logics had two sources. The earliest was an observation by Jan Rutten in his now-classic paper [9] : Kripke frames and models as they appear in modal logic are coalgebras of certain endofunctors on Set. At the same time, logical systems which had a "modal feel" such as the Hennessy-Milner logic coming from concurrency theory were also interpreted on coalgebras. Jon Barwise and I were interested in connections to hypersets, and the second source of coalgebraic logics was our result in Vicious Circles [3] that worlds in Kripke models may be characterized up to bisimulation by single sentences in infinitary modal logic. A version of this strong Hennessy-Milnertype property had actually been obtained earlier for modal logic, in van Benthem and Bergstra [4] . It was then natural to try to see the sentences in various modal logics as "observations" in some general sense, and then to try to use the concepts in coalgebra as a way to define logics from functors. The first work in this direction was another chapter in [3] . But that book shunned category theory and so worked with operators on sets instead of functors.
Having categorical concepts improved matters. The goal of our paper [6] was to show the following: To each endofunctor F on Set satisfying some weak conditions, one should obtain a logical language L F which would be interpreted on the coalgebras of F . The logics should be appropriate for coalgebraic reasoning in the sense that for all coalgebras (A, α) for F and all a, b ∈ A, a and b are bisimilar in A iff they satisfy the same sentences φ ∈ L F in (A, α).
(1) This condition is called expressivity for the language L F . Moreover, taking F to be a functor associated with semantic models that already existed should result in a language L F which had already been independently studied, or at least looked natural. Also, because the results in [3] for the power set functor pointed to infinitary modal logic, it was also of interest to look at the strong version of (1), namely strong expressivity: for all (A, α) and all a ∈ A there is a sentence φ ∈ L F such that for all b ∈ A: a and b are bisimilar in A iff b satisfies φ a .
I'll call the approach of [6] the the direct approach to generalizing modal logics to coalgebra. The results coming from this approach were mixed. On the one hand, for functors F meeting three conditions, one could formulate a language L F and obtain the strong expressivity result formulated in (2). We'll spell out those conditions in due course. But on the other, the languages coming from the direct approach were not generalizations of standard systems such as classical modal logic, rather they generalized fragments of them. In fact, most of the papers that came after [6] complained that the syntax of L F was not much of a syntax at all. This led to the main body of work in coalgebraic modal logic, where one begins not just with a functor but with a family of predicate liftings for it. (See Pattinson [7] for the first paper and, e.g., Schröder [10] for a more recent on issues related to that of the current paper.) From these, one then defines L F ; this time the syntax looks much more familiar in the concrete cases of interest. I'll call this the predicate lifting approach. Then one of the main issues in the resulting large and impressive literature has again been to establish expressivity in the form of (1). The functors again had some requirements, different from the ones in [6] . Of special note here was the requirement that F be finitary; this made it possible to have L F be a countable set. So at this point, it will be useful to mention the actual conditions on the functors F in the direct approach. They were: (a) F is standard (it preserves inclusions of sets); (b) F preserves weak pullbacks; and (c) F is uniform. It would take us too far afield to define uniformity. It certainly seemed from the presentation in [6] that conditions like uniformity would be needed to show the expressivity of L F , and the weak pullback preservation was even more important: the basic lemmas in [6] seemed to require it at every step.
In addition, when one compared the expressivity results for the direct approach to those in the predicate lifting approach, the following question was natural: if one took the direct logics and only looked at some "small" fragment of them, say the fragment obtained by restricting the infinitary conjunctions to be finite, and if F were finitary to begin with, would L F be expressive?
The main result in Section 4 answers this question affirmatively. Actually, the work here points to a different way to execute the direct approach in the first place. If one works with a finitary endofunctor on Set, it is possible to define L F and give its semantics in a very straightforward and simple way, and then to prove the expressivity in a few steps. It turns out that conjunction is not needed in the language. Further, one does not need any requirements on F except that it be finitary. However, when dealing with functors that need not preserve weak pullbacks, the appropriate statement of expressivity would refer not to bisimilarity but rather to behavioral equivalence: a and b have the same image in a final coalgebra for F iff they satisfy the same sentences φ ∈ L F in (A, α). We define L F and prove expressivity in this sense in Section 4.
This modest paper has two points. We have been discussing the contribution to the study of coalgebraic versions of modal logic. The second point is a representation theorem for the final coalgebra of certain endofunctors on Set, namely the finitary ones. It turns out that this second point is used in establishing the expressivity result for L F . It may well be of independent interest, and we discuss it in the next two sections.
Final coalgebras via the final sequence
Let F be an endofunctor on a category C. Perhaps the most common way to obtain a final coalgebra for F is to consider the final sequence, the ω op -chain
Here and below, 1 is final object in the category, and ! : F 1 → 1 is by finality. A cone over the final sequence is an object A together with a family of morphisms a n : A → F n 1 such that a n = F n ! · a n+1 for all n. A limit of the final sequence is a cone over it (L, l n : L → F n 1) with the universal property that if (A, a n : A → F n 1) is any cone over the final sequence, then there is a unique connecting morphism f : A → L such that for all n, a n = l n · f .
Assume that the limit above exists. There always is a morphism m : F L → L, the connecting morphism from the cone (F L, a n : F L → F n 1), where a 0 is by finality, and a n+1 = F l n . (To check that this is indeed a cone, note that our limit cone has l n−1 = F n−1 ! · l n , and so F l n−1 = F n ! · F l n .) So we have a unique m : F L → L such that for all n, l n · m = a n . That is, l 0 · m is the map from F L to 1, and for all n,
Assuming that the limit L of the chain (3) exists and that F preserves it, then as shown in Adámek [1] , m is an isomorphism, and as a result, (L, m −1 ) is a final coalgebra of F . This result is well-known. We shall not need details of the proof. Instead, we are concerned with the situation where m is not an isomorphism but is only injective.
The "combinatory" fact in Lemma 2.1 below is due to James Worrell and is crucial for our work. Actually, Worrell weakens the hypothesis from "finitary" to "κ-accessible" functors, where κ is some infinite cardinal.
We wish to prove this, not only to make this paper self-contained but also because it is the only place where we explicitly call on the notion of a finitary functor. Recall that in Set, L may be taken to be the set of functions g with domain ω such that for all n, g(n) ∈ F n 1 and such that for all n F n !(g(n+ 1)) = g(n). Moreover, we take l n (g) = g(n) for all n.
We now sketch the proof of Lemma 2.1. (We are actually proving a special case of the result from [12] .) Let x, y ∈ F L, and assume that mx = my. By the assumption that F is finitary, there is a finite set S, a map f : S → L and
of f is also finite. We claim that for some k, l k · f is injective. Here is the reasoning. Let a and b be different members of f [S]. We think of a and b as functions on the natural numbers, and each l n works by applying these to the number n. Since a = b, we must have some n = n(a, b) such that l n (a) = a(n) = b(n) = l n (b). And for all m > n, we also have
is also finite, and so max{n(a, b) : (a, b) ∈ S} is a natural number, say k. For this k, l k · f is injective.
Functors on Set preserve injectivity of maps with non-empty domain, and so F (l k · f ) is injective. By (4), this is the same as
The following is perhaps the main point in [12] : Assuming only that m : F L → L is injective, the limit of the next ω steps in the final sequence
is the carrier of a final F -coalgebra structure.
Cones derived over the final sequences via coalgebras
Let (A, α) be a coalgebra for F . We have maps α n : A → F n 1 as follows: α 0 is by finality, and α n+1 = F α n · α. This gives a cone over the final sequence: an easy induction shows the required fact that for all n, α n = F n ! · α n+1 . We have a unique α † : A → L such that for all n, α n = l n · α † . We call the family α n the cone over the final sequence determined by (A, α), and α † is the connecting morphism.
Lemma 2.2 α
† is the unique coalgebra-to-algebra morphism, the unique morphism such that the diagram below commutes:
Proof We check first that the diagram commutes. For this, we show that m · F α † · α satisfies the condition uniquely defining α † . For all n,
We check that for all n, α n = l n · β. For n = 0, this is clear. Assuming that α n = l n · β, note that
This completes the proof. ⊣
We shall use an easy consequence of Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.3 Let (A, α) and (B, β) be coalgebras for F and let χ : A → B be a coalgebra morphism. Let α † and β † be the connecting morphisms for the cones over the final sequence from these coalgebras. Then β † · χ = α † .
Final coalgebras for finitary functors
We are still concerned with finitary endofunctors on Set. We define a special subset L * of the limit L, and show that L * is the carrier of a final coalgebra structure.
The carrier set Let L * be the subset of L consisting of the functions g ∈ L such that for some coalgebra (A, α) and some a ∈ A, g = α † (a). In words, we take the union of all images of all of the connecting maps from coalgebras to the limit L. Then we have an inclusion i : L * → L. Also, the connecting map
point in the image of j A does belong to L * . Our main result in this section, Theorem 3.3, shows that L * is the carrier of a final coalgebra structure. The main point is to define the structure map on L * , and this is where the injectivity of m is critical. The details are in Lemma 3.1.
Before we turn to that result, we should mention the origin of the definition of L * . As far as I know, its first use was in Kurz and Pattinson [5] , a paper connected with the second topic of this one, but not with a final coalgebra construction. Viglizzo [11] used what we are calling L * to construct the final coalgebra of the probabilistic Kripke functors on Set; these are the smallest collection containing the identity, constants, the finite power set, and the discrete distribution functor and closed under product, coproduct, and function space from a fixed set. Now all of the functors in this class are finitary, and so in a sense our observation in this section is merely a confirmation that the work in [11] generalizes to the setting of finitary functors.
2. There is a function l * : L * → F L * so that the square on the right below commutes:
3. Finally, for any coalgebra (A, α) the square on the left commutes, as does the top (by definition).
Proof Let g ∈ L * . Let (B, β) and b ∈ B be such that
For the uniqueness of x, note that we may assume that L * is non-empty. (For if L * were empty, then there would be no coalgebras for F whatsoever, except for the one with empty carrier. Then F would be the constant functor with value ∅. But then there would be just one coalgebra for F , and this would be the final coalgebra.) And now, recall that every functor on Set preserves injectivity of maps with non-empty domain. So we see that F i is injective. So is m, by the assumption in this result. We thus see that m · F i is injective; hence x is unique.
The uniqueness defines l * . (That is, for each g ∈ L * we used some coalgebra (B, β) or other to define l * (g), but the definition was independent of the coalgebra used.) The commutativity of the right square follows. For the one on the left, let a ∈ A. We show that l * (j A (a)) = (F j A · α)a by showing that the latter object satisfies the condition which uniquely defines the former. The verification is:
(We are using Lemma 2.2.) ⊣ Once again, by Lemma 3.1 we have a map l * : L * → F L * . Being a coalgebra structure for F , l * gives rise to a connecting map (l
Proof By Lemma 3.1, i is a coalgebra-to-algebra morphism: m · F i · l * = i. Hence we have (l * ) † = i by the uniqueness part of Lemma 2.
⊣
The previous lemma is the key property of l * . For readers interested in modal logic, it calls to mind the parallel lemma for the theory map from canonical model into itself. The surjectivity is tantamount to the completeness theorem for the logic. Proof Let (A, α) be a coalgebra, and let α † : A → L be its connecting map. Let j A : A → L * be as above, so that i · j A = α † . By Lemma 3.1, j A : A → L * is a morphism of coalgebras. It remains to prove the uniqueness of j A . Let k : A → L * be a coalgebra morphism. By Lemma 2.3, α † = (l * ) † · k, and by the last lemma, this is i · k.
The original development
Referees suggested that the result of the last section it is implicit in Worrell [12] : one may take for the carrier of a final coalgebra of a finitary functor the union of all images of all coalgebras in the limit of the the first ω terms of the final sequence. To substantiate this, we shall re-prove this result in a different way, by calling on further results in Worrell's paper. To present things in a way which shortens the original argument, we also use Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3.
Lemma 3.4 Assume again that m : F L → L is injective, and let l be such that l · m = id F L . For every F -coalgebra (A, α), α † is a coalgebra morphism from (A, α) to (L, l). As a result, (L, l) is a weakly final coalgebra for F .
Proof We use Lemma 2.2:
This is Proposition 7 in Worrell [12] . Proposition 8 is that l † is idempotent. We can prove this as follows: Apply Lemma 3.4 to l : L → F L to see that l † is a coalgebra morphism from (L, l) to itself. Then by Lemma 2.3,
We look back at (6), or rather the special case of this when a : A → F A is l : L → F L. Then with this choice of l * , the two squares commute. We omit the calculations. The point is that we have defined L * and l * in such a way that l * is a coalgebra morphism, and also so that i is a coalgebra-to-algebra morphism. Then the proof that l * is a final coalgebra is just as before (see Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.3).
Recall that L * was defined using idempotence of l † . The one remaining point in this development would be to show that L
* is just what we said it was in the previous section, the union of the images of all coalgebras inside L. This would mean that for all coalgebras (A, a), the final coalgebra map from A to L * (it is j A ) satisfies i · j A = α † . But j A is a coalgebra morphism, and i = (l * ) † , and so this follows from Lemma 2.3.
A final remark It might also be interesting to view Theorem 3.3 from a different angle. Let F be any endofunctor on Set which has a final coalgebra. It follows from a theorem in Adámek and Koubek [2] that for every coalgebra (A, α) and all a, b ∈ A, a and b are identified by the final coalgebra morphism iff all of their images in the (possibly transfinite) final sequence of F agree. In this paper, we are only concerned with finitary endofunctors, and Theorem 3.3 gives a refinement: a and b are identified by the final coalgebra morphism iff all of their images in the first ω steps of final sequence of F agree. This point was made earlier by Dirk Pattinson, in Theorem 4.1 of [7] , and (with a proof) in Theorem 3.1.11 of [8] .
An expressive coalgebraic logic in the finitary setting
At this point, we return to the discussion of coalgebraic generalizations of modal logic from our Introduction. Let F be a finitary functor on sets. Let L = L F be ∞ n=0 F n 1, where we understand F 0 1 = 1, and take 1 to be a singleton set which we call {true}. Here is how we interpret L on a coalgebra for F , say (A, α). We define satisfaction relations S n ⊆ A × F n 1 by recursion on n. (We should write S n (A) or S n,A to indicate the dependence on the coalgebra involved. We do use this notation in Lemma 4.3 below, since there are two coalgebras involved. But outside of that result, we suppress the mention of the underlying structure.)
If φ ∈ F n 1 we sometimes say that a satisfies φ if (a, φ) ∈ S n , and write a |= φ.
We start with S 0 = A × 1, so that all a ∈ A satisfy true. Given S n ⊆ A × F n 1, we have π 1 : S n → A and π 2 : S n → F n 1. Let
Recall also that we have α n : A → F n 1; α 0 is by finality, and α n+1 = F α n ·α.
Lemma 4.1 Consider each α n as a subset of A × F n 1. For all n, α n ⊆ S n .
Proof By induction on n. For n = 0, we have α 0 = A × 1 = S 0 . Assume that α n ⊆ S n . Let f : A → S n be given by f (a) = (a, α n (a)). Then π 1 · f = id A , and
This completes the proof. ⊣ Lemma 4.2 For all n, α n = S n .
Proof By induction on n. We again have the case n = 0 by definition. Assume that α n = S n . Suppose that (a, φ) ∈ S n+1 , and let v ∈ F (S n ) be such that (F π 1 )v = α(a) and (F π 2 )v = ψ. By our last result, let w ∈ F (S n ) be such that (F π 1 )w = α(a) and (F π 2 )w = α n+1 (a). Recall that π 1 and π 2 are the projections from S n to A and to F n 1. But S n = α n by our induction hypothesis. And thus π 2 = α n · π 1 . (This is true for projections from any function whatsoever, when considered as a relation between its domain and codomain.) It follows that
In other words, the only element of F n+1 1 satisfied by a is α n+1 (a). ⊣ One can also prove Lemma 4.2 directly by induction on n, using the relation lifting F of F . Without assumptions on F , F need not be an endofunctor on the category of relations, but this is not an obstacle to its use here. Observe that S n+1 is by definition the relational composition Gr(α) • F (S n ). (We are using Gr(f ) for the graph relation of a function, and • denotes relational composition.) It is a general fact about relation lifting that F (Gr(f )) = Gr(F f ). An easy induction then shows that S n = Gr(α n ). This is Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.3 Coalgebra morphisms preserve the semantics. That is, if f : (A, α) → (B, β) is a coalgebra morphism and φ ∈ L, then a |= φ iff f a |= φ.
Proof An easy induction shows that for each n, the diagram below commutes:
In more detail: the commutativity is clear for n = 0. Assuming it for n, we have
Let φ ∈ F n 1 and a ∈ A. Then we have the following chain of equivalences:
This completes the proof. ⊣ Theorem 4.4 Let F be finitary, and let (C, γ) be a final coalgebra for F . Let (A, α) be a coalgebra for F , and let ψ : A → C be a final coalgebra morphism. Then a, b ∈ A satisfy the same sentences of L iff ψ(a) = ψ(b).
Proof We work with the representation of the final coalgebra for F given in Section 3. In our earlier notation, we may assume that (C, γ) = (L * , l * ) and that ψ = j A . Suppose that a and b satisfy the same sentences of L. Due to 
Discussion
We close with some examples of the logical systems L F and with comments on the general construction. First, let F be the finite power set functor P f in . In this case, L F is the (disjoint) union of {true}, {∅, {true}}, . . ., P n f in {true}, . . .. The semantics of true is trivial. Every other sentence φ is a set of sentences. In a coalgebra (A, α), a |= φ iff (∀b ∈ α(a))(∃ψ ∈ φ)b |= φ and (∀ψ ∈ φ)(∃b ∈ α(a))b |= φ We may view a coalgebra for F as a Kripke model for modal logic, except where there are no atomic propositions. The sentences in L F are then the characterizing sentences of modal logic (also called the Fine normal forms).
Second, let F X = {a, b} + (X × X), where a = b are arbitrary sets. Then L F  contains true, a, b, (true, true), (a, b), ((a, b), (b, b) ), etc. Here is an example: let X = {1, 2, 3, 4}, let f : X → F X be f (1) = a, f (2) = b, f (3) = (2, 1), and f (4) = (3, 2). We have 3 |= (b, a), and also 4 |= ((true, true), b). For this functor F , it is easy to directly verify that L F is expressive.
These examples point to a general defect in the logics L F : not only do they lack the boolean connectives, in addition, the logics are in general not even closed under the functor. That is, F (L F ) is in general not a subset of L F . In fact, there are sentences of F (L F ) which are not semantically equivalent to sentences of L F . (For a concrete example coming from the functor just above, consider (a, true).)
For this reason, I would think that anyone unhappy with the syntax of coalgebraic logic as in [6] would be even less pleased with the proposal here. And so the main point of having the language L F would be that it appears to be a minimal language for expressivity: to show any language L to be expressive, even one obtained using predicate liftings or other devices, one need only show that L includes sentences which are logically equivalent to those of L F .
We conclude with a few remarks going back to our point in the Introduction about which conditions on finitary functors are needed in the study of coalgebraic logics. The condition of uniformity in [6] mainly came into play for the sake of the full power set. Indeed, the main application of uniformity was to express the coalgebraic logic of a uniform functor in terms of infinitary modal logic, a language for which we already had the strong expressivity. If one restricts attention to accessible functors, my suspicion is that uniformity will not be needed in expressivity results. But getting back to the finitary case, the only case considered in this paper, it appears now that extra conditions, particularly standardness and preservation of weak pullbacks, might well be needed to obtain languages stronger than the language L F from this paper. For example, to get a language L 1 closed under the functor, we would take L 1 to be the least fixed point (initial algebra) of 1 + F . So we have
(Recall that our L F is n F n 1.) It is convenient here to assume that F is standard so that we may write L 1 as n L 1 (n), where L 1 (0) = ∅, and L 1 (n+1) = 1 + F L 1 (n). And again assuming the standardness, it is not so hard to re-prove the results of the previous section to show the expressivity for all finitary F . There are a few more details, but not significantly more than we have seen in Section 4.
To have the additional closure under binary conjunction, one would take a language like L 2 , the least solution of
Alternatively, one could just take the finite power set and consider
This is exactly the finite version of what was done in earlier in [6] . In fact, one would like to go even further and have a language L 4 with a syntactic negation, and for this one only needs to add another summand.
But at this point, even to prove the basic facts on semantics for languages of this type seems to require that F preserve weak pullbacks, or perhaps a weaker condition such as preservation of weak monos. This matter is the main open question coming from this paper: given a finitary functor F are any conditions needed to guarantee the existence of a language for coalgebras of F which is expressive, closed under the functor itself, and under the finite boolean operations?
If so, what are the weakest conditions on F ?
